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I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual Property as a legal academic field has evolved through
three stages. During the first stage, Intellectual Property was a set of service
courses, offered by a few law schools in recognition that attention had to be
paid to patent, copyright, and trademark law in the curriculum because some
students would be interested in practicing in these areas. Except for the
field of trademark, which sometimes would arise in the context of unfair
competition law or consumer protection courses, Intellectual Property was
not viewed as a serious discipline—certainly not one suitable for intense
academic inquiry or policy.
Then, something changed in the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s.
One sign of this change was the addition of Intellectual Property as a course
in the Yale Law School Catalogue for 1984-85.1 Before then, Yale offered
separate classes in copyrights, trademarks, and patents, or combinations
thereof. Outside academia, the field received even more attention at the
domestic and international levels, perhaps out of greater concern with the
need to promote innovation and economic growth, perhaps out of industry
pressures as certain high technology industries expanded economically and
then politically, or perhaps out of the move to privatize and liberalize legal
systems. Whether the shift from the New Deal paradigm in the United
States or the shift towards more liberal political and economic regimes in
*
This Article was presented at the Scholarly Symposia Series on Current Issues in Intellectual
Property Law, held at The University of Dayton School of Law on September 24, 2009. I would like to
thank Dean Lisa Kloppenberg for the invitation and her continued confidence in my work and abilities. I
would also like to thank Dayton colleagues Kelly Henrici, Dennis Greene, Tracy Reilly, Harry Gerla,
Julie Zink, and Sam Han for their comments and support during my visit. I would also like to thank the
editors of the Law Review for asking to publish my presentation.
**
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A., Amherst College; PhD
(Economics), The University of Michigan; J.D. (Stanford).
1
YALE LAW SCHOOL CATALOGUE (1984).
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certain developing countries, Intellectual Property became hot; all schools
starting expanding in this area (albeit at different rates), and much academic
inquiry focused on Intellectual Property law and policy. The field obtained
constitutional valence both through an increased focus on constitutional law
and norms in Intellectual Property and through a recognition that Intellectual
Property law may perhaps be constitutive of (i.e. the foundation for) the law
and the economy more broadly. This expansion seemed to reach a plateau
with some big Supreme Court defeats for the academy (Eldred v. Ashcroft,2
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.3) and increased
legislative efforts, which took Intellectual Property out of the realm of
academic theory and back into the dealings of the Beltway. Intellectual
Property has become normalized with many voices formulating arguments
within an established academic frame of ownership, on the one hand, and
access, on the other.
Now, we are talking about a new stage of Intellectual Property: one
I refer to as the transactional turn. This stage of Intellectual Property is
about recognizing and developing the transactional practice of Intellectual
Property as opposed to defining the rights structure of Intellectual Property
within a set of constitutional norms. At one level, this turn reflects ordinary
practice. Intellectual Property is a business asset, a source of value, and we
need to understand how this set of rights called Intellectual Property is
transferred and restructured through transactions within and between firms.
What is relevant in the study of Intellectual Property is how these rights are
licensed, acquired, and transformed into value. In some ways, this
progression is the logical one from constitutional Intellectual Property.
Once foundational rights are established, the next step is to see how
they are practically administered and used.
At another level, the
transactional turn reflects some dissatisfaction with the earlier stage. The
constitutionalization of Intellectual Property failed.
Eldred was a
disappointing decision; the Court seemed to conclude that Congress can
pretty much do what it wants with regard to copyright (and patent)
legislation.4 If Congress pulls the strings, then Intellectual Property
constituencies would have to learn how to play Beltway politics to move the
game in their favor. Grokster, perhaps, solidified this sense of failure (at
least symbolically—the case really may not be much of a watershed
practically) by revealing that Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
2
See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998).
3
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(holding that Grokster’s peer-to-peer file sharing program would be used to commit copyright
infringement).
4
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (“As we read the Framers’ instruction, the Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve
the ends of the Clause.”).
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Studios, Inc.,5 the keystone of copyright fair use, may not be that protective
or limiting on copyright after all.6 If the cathedral fails to stand, then we are
left to play with the individual stones.
The latter scenario is overly pessimistic. The shift to considering
Intellectual Property as a business asset, the heart of the transactional turn,
may be an acknowledgement that true Intellectual Property reform can best
occur through better Intellectual Property practice. If we want to promote
greater use and dissemination of protected works, then creating legal rules
of protection may be wholly inadequate, especially if the rights protective of
users and employees can readily be transacted away. Focus instead on the
transactions themselves: develop a richer set of licensing terms, understand
how these terms can be disseminated and then enforced by the courts,
consider doctrines that shape transactional practice (such as the first sale
doctrine in the recent Supreme Court decision in Quanta Computers, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc.7), think about the life of Intellectual Property in the
world of commerce, and see how the wheels of commerce can shape the
scope of Intellectual Property rights.
Hence, the transactional turn in Intellectual Property that I am
seeing in current Intellectual Property study. This vision is not myopia on
my part because I am the co-author of a casebook on Intellectual Property in
Business Organizations.8 I see this turn in the scholarship of many
Intellectual Property colleagues, in the conferences on entrepreneurship, in
the curriculum of some law schools, and in the development of case law,
particularly the big Supreme Court Intellectual Property decisions since
2005 (eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,9 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc.,10 KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,11 and Quanta
Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.12). I will discuss the implications of
this transactional turn for Intellectual Property policy towards the end of this
article. I would first like to explore what this transactional turn entails,
looking at the important overlap between Intellectual Property and
transactional practice in Section Two, and then at the details of a
transactional Intellectual Property course in Section Three. Section Four
offers considerations on how to implement a transactional focus in an
Intellectual Property curriculum. Section Five concludes.

5

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932.
Quanta Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008).
8
RICHARD GRUNER, SHUBHA GHOSH & JAY KESAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (LexisNexis 2006).
9
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
10
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
11
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
12
Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2109.
6
7
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II. THE TRANSACTIONAL TURN
Everyone has some sense of what Intellectual Property is about (the
set of rules and institutions designed to promote innovation and creativity in
society), but the term transactional law may be less clear. The term covers,
at the least, traditional business law courses such as Business Enterprise (or
Business Organizations, Business Associations, or some similar term),
Securities, Mergers & Acquisitions, and other related doctrinal areas. More
broadly, the transactional law curriculum would also include skills-focused
courses such as negotiation, contract drafting, and deal-making. So
described, what I am calling the transactional law curriculum includes
clinical and doctrinal courses that are geared towards developing
transactional skill sets, both through learning the details of transactional
practice and through understanding legal relationships as transactional (as
opposed to adversarial).
My appreciation of the transactional turn in Intellectual Property
arose from the need for Intellectual Property reform. Like other law
professors and practitioners, I have watched the ongoing debates over the
past fifteen years or so (roughly when I formally entered into the area of
Intellectual Property with coursework in law school), including the debate
over ownership and access and the role of each in promoting innovation. I
have watched as these issues were addressed at the statutory and
constitutional levels. My continuing concern, however, has been with
Intellectual Property practice in its many ways—in other words, how the
policies of Intellectual Property have become reflected in practice. Of
course, practice means different things to different constituencies. For the
Intellectual Property bar, it often means how to ensure that one's patent is
granted and not challenged (even seemingly at the expense of whether the
patent covers a valuable invention or at the expense of future inventors or
users). The Intellectual Property bar, for obvious reasons, is concerned with
strong Intellectual Property protection even if such protection is not
conducive from a broader perspective for innovation. Users and follow-on
inventors, creative and inventive people of many stripes, are often ignored in
the balance. One needs to recognize Intellectual Property practice pretty
broadly—especially the way in which it is used by and affects wide sets of
constituencies, not just ones represented within the Intellectual Property bar.
The response in these Intellectual Property debates has been one of
balance, which often means finding some utilitarian, highly principled way
to define legal rights to reach the correct policy result. I have become
skeptical of this notion of balance, not just in the area of Intellectual
Property, but perhaps more broadly.13 Focusing on Intellectual Property
13

For a partial critique of the notion of balance in intellectual property law, see Shubha Ghosh,
Patent Law and the Assurance Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation, 18 CAN.
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policy here, I suggest that reaching the right result is not a matter of balance
in the abstract, but in recognizing the practices affected by a legal rule and
coming up with an approach that attempts to be the least disruptive to the
broad set of practices that arguably tend to promote innovation. Recent
Supreme Court decisions in the field of Intellectual Property exemplify this
goal by implicitly recognizing the transactional turn and have been largely
successful, especially when compared to reforms pursued by Congress and
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). I want to
emphasize this last point: my argument is about relative institutional success
as opposed to absolute success. The latter is rarely possible in a world with
a large set of often irreconcilable interests. From the perspective of
incremental change and relative competence, Supreme Court patent reform
has done a good job.
I will discuss three cases in which the Court has implicitly
recognized the transactional turn in Intellectual Property and the role of
Intellectual Property as a business asset, and I will make the point for the
success of the decisions. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.C.C., a 2006
decision, the Court ruled that patent injunctions were discretionary.14 The
Court split three ways on how this discretion was to be exercised, with one
group of three supporting traditional equitable principles,15 another group of
three supporting principles based upon patent policies,16 and a third group
supporting principles based on the business effects of the injunction on the
defendant.17 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., a 2007 decision, the
Court attempted to raise the standard for non-obviousness in patent law in
response to concerns over low-quality patents issued by the USPTO that
potentially affected the integrity and reputation of the patent system.18
Finally, in Quanta Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., a 2008 decision,
the Court applied the principle of patent exhaustion, specifically the first
sale doctrine, to strike down certain licensing practices that allowed the
patent owner to control use and distribution by downstream users of the
patented technology.19 Each of these decisions, as well as others I could
have mentioned, was shaped by the business use of patent law and
potentially its disruptive effect on markets and competition. These cases are
examples of the transactional turn in action.

J. L. & JURIS. 307, 327-28 (2005) (examining patent law as a response to a particular failure in private
orderings as opposed to a balance between private and public interests).
14
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
15
Id. at 394.
16
Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J., concurring).
18
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-18 (2007).
19
Quanta Computers, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008).
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As I have stated before, these cases are not examples of perfection.
Members of the Intellectual Property bar and business practitioners are often
up in arms about these decisions. These cases illustrate how to pursue
patent reform narrowly and Intellectual Property reform more broadly, by
giving attention to the use of Intellectual Property as a business asset. These
are examples of practical reforms—ones that attempt to align Intellectual
Property law more effectively with its goals of promoting innovation and
shaping markets.
At a recent conference, a speaker described the Court's treatment of
Intellectual Property as an example of neoconservative appeal to markets
and resulting skepticism of Intellectual Property.20 I am not sure if this is
completely the case. Perhaps there are Justices who are influenced by
neoconservative ideology. I am not sure if that is the case for the more
liberal Justices on the Court. Perhaps the transactional turn in Intellectual
Property reflects a neoconservative consensus in the political arena that, in
turn, affects the legal system. I am not convinced of that either; one can
identify support for Intellectual Property from both conservative and liberal
camps. A better explanation is that the Court is engaged in common law
decision making to resolve what is viewed as the anti-competitive effects of
Intellectual Property law.21 The eBay decision, with its defense of judicial
discretion, is a good example of common law reasoning in action, so are the
KSR and Quanta decisions.
Skeptics of my interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions may
point to two decisions in which the Court, perhaps, supported business
interests too readily. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld Congress's
extension of the copyright term for already created works by twenty years.22
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, the Court found a
peer-to-peer network potentially liable under a novel theory of secondary
liability.23 Arguably, each of these cases reflects how the Court bends too
readily to business interests. I have two responses to this argument. First,
there are other theories under which these cases can be understood. In
Eldred, the Court was deferring to Congress's legislative judgment, which is
admittedly a selective decision by the Court, but also is a decision that is
ostensibly based on deeply-rooted institutional grounds.24 In Grokster, the
Court was following the logic of its 1984 Sony decision, which was
correctly decided for upholding disruptive technologies, but was
20
See Mathew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study,
97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 838 (2009) (reporting empirical support for the view that conservative judges tend
to vote in favor of IP owners).
21
See Shubha Ghosh, Carte Blanche, Quanta, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1209, 121214 (2009) (analyzing the role of courts as enforcer of competition norms).
22
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
23
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933-34 (2005).
24
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
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fundamentally misguided in reading a broad secondary liability taken from
the Patent Act into copyright law.25 Second, and more importantly, these
two cases illustrate the need for understanding the transactional turn because
in each of these two cases the Court ignored the business implications of the
rule at issue and, as a result, decided cases that were antithetical to the
principles of competition and innovation that is at the heart of the
transactional turn.26
The Supreme Court’s Eldred decision illustrates the Court’s
shortsightedness in recognizing the transactional turn in Intellectual
Property. The Court adopted a deferential approach to Congress’s extension
of the copyright term, which also retroactively applied to works already
created and protected under copyright law. Congress, according to the
Court, had a rational basis for adding twenty years across the board to the
duration of the copyright.27 Part of Congress’s rationale rested in
conforming to international standards for the copyright term.28 Also, part of
the rationale was creating incentives for commercializing works published
decades earlier, particularly as new media for dissemination, such as
through digital platforms, emerged.29 In other words, the Court accepted the
argument that an additional twenty years of copyright protection and
attendant economic returns would help publishers, and perhaps even
authors, mine new markets for already created works.
Even if one were to accept the argument that twenty years of future
economic returns (appropriately discounted) were enough to stimulate the
creation of these markets,30 the Court’s reasoning was inconsistent with the
facts of the case. In Eldred, the plaintiff challenging the term extension was
himself attempting to digitize and potentially commercialize works that
were about to fall in the public domain before Congress essentially
interfered with his business plans by extending the copyright term.31 If
Eldred did not need the incentive of copyright, then why would anyone
else? The Court’s deference to Congress was built on an economic model of
copyright that overlooked the transactions that the copyright public domain
made possible. The Eldred decision privileged a business model based on
proprietary copyright over alternative business models less dependent on
copyright without giving much consideration to the competing set of
transactions.

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Published by eCommons, 2009

See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.
See id.; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08.
See id. at 195, 199, 206.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 193.

336

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

An opportunity to adopt the transactional turn in Intellectual
Property was also missed in the Supreme Court’s 2005 Grokster decision.32
This case, involving the secondary liability of file sharing systems, raised
two sets of transactional issues.33 The first issue raised is that of the set of
transactions between the users of file sharing systems and the copyright
owners.34 File sharing technology users stood in the same position with
respect to the copyright owners as the users of the videocassette recorder in
the 1984 Sony decision.35 In this latter decision, the Court found that the
videocassette recorder constituted fair use when used to copy broadcasted
programs for time-sharing purposes.36 As Wendy Gordon famously stated,
the transactional failure arising from the difficulty of negotiating a license
between copyright owners and videocassette recorder users justified this
finding of fair use.37 Fair use results from the market failure in establishing
transactions that would allow copyright owners to price the use of broadcast
materials for time-sharing purposes. As applied to the facts of the Grokster
case, the market failure analysis justified the finding of fair use of file
sharing technologies, which permitted multiple, discrete uses among many
users that would be difficult for the copyright owner to price through
negotiated transactions. This transactional failure, analogizing from the
Sony case, was the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in favor of
Grokster.38
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit illustrates the
broader set of transactions raised by disruptive technologies like file
sharing.39 In granting certiorari in the Grokster case, the Court scrutinized
the substantial noninfringing use standard for secondary liability established
by the 1984 Sony decision.40 Under the substantial noninfringing use test, a
disruptive technology creates secondary liability for the manufacturer or
distributor of such technology if there is no substantial noninfringing use of
the technology.41
With respect to the file sharing technology, the Ninth Circuit found
that there was substantial noninfringing use of file sharing, and therefore,

32

See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(holding that Grokster’s peer-to-peer file sharing program would be used to commit copyright
infringement).
33
Id. at 930.
34
Id. at 925.
35
Id. at 942.
36
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
37
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628-30 (1982).
38
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F. 3d 1154, 1163-64 (2004).
39
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INVENTOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE
GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xviii-xix (1997) (introducing and explaining concept of disruptive technologies).
40
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 927.
41
Id. at 933-34.
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there was no secondary liability.42 The Supreme Court was split on this
issue between Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, authoring contesting
concurring opinions that differed on how substantial the noninfringing use
had to be.43 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion suggests that the noninfringing use
has to be quite substantial to warrant a finding against secondary liability.44
Justice Breyer, by contrast, pointed out that substantial noninfringing use
was meant to be a flexible standard favorable to new technologies that might
affect the rights of copyright owners.45
This split on how to apply its own precedent set in the 1984 Sony
decision led the Court to a new test for secondary liability based on
inducement by the manufacturer or distributor of the disruptive technology
to promote copyright infringement.46 The Court remanded the case for the
application of this new test to the file sharing technology.47 While the Sony
test was based on the transactional failure in negotiating a license between
the copyright owner and the user of the technology, the inducement test
focuses on the transactional relationship between the manufacturer and the
distributor of the technology and the user.48 Specifically, under the
inducement test, encouragement by the manufacturer or distributor of
copyright infringement by the user could provide the basis for secondary
liability.49
As my discussion of Sony and Grokster indicates, the transactions
over and around Intellectual Property provide the background for the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on secondary liability in copyright. What is
missing is a systematic treatment of transactional issues by academics and
by practitioners. For example, in neither Sony nor Grokster did the Court
address the transactional issues arising between the copyright owner and the
manufacturer and distributor of the disruptive technology. Is it possible, for
example, for these two parties to develop a licensing arrangement for the use
of the technology? What are the implications for vertical integration of the
copyright owner and the owner of the disruptive technology? These
transactional issues should inform the policy underlying the imposition of
secondary liability.
Additionally, the Copyright Act, unlike the Patent Act, is relatively
silent about secondary liability that arises from a competing technology.50
42

Id. at 927-28.
Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at 965-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
44
Id.at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
45
Id. at 965-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 936-37.
47
Id. at 941.
48
Id. at 937.
49
Id. at 940.
50
See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941, 977-78 (2007)
(comparing and contrasting treatment of secondary liability in patent and copyright law).
43
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This silence might suggest that Congress did not intend secondary liability
to be so broad as to encompass the creator of new copying technologies
within the property rights of the copyright owner.51 Instead, the Supreme
Court in both its Sony and Grokster decisions extended the standards for
secondary liability under the Patent Act into copyright law. This move not
only ignores the two very different statutory schemes but also the
differences for the purpose of transactions raised by disruptive technologies
for patents and for copyrights.
From a transactional perspective, the Supreme Court’s extension of
secondary liability for disruptive technologies from patent law to copyright
law was an error of concept and policy. There are good reasons to think that
copyright law should be more permissive to new technologies than patent
law. First of all, patent law arguably provides a stronger right to exclude
than copyright law. This stronger right is supported by the administrative
hurdles that a patent owner must go through before obtaining the patent
grant. By contrast, a copyright is obtained automatically upon the creation
of the work. The stronger right and higher administrative burden is justified
for patents, which are to be awarded to novel and innovative inventions that
expand the scope of current knowledge in a field. Copyrights, by contrast,
protect personal, and often times idiosyncratic, expression.52
Second, and more importantly, a copyright’s domain covers the
right to exclude specific types of uses: copying, adapting, distributing,
publicly performing, and publicly displaying.53 Patent law, by contrast,
gives the recipient of the patent a broad right to exclude a wide range of
uses, consistent with the promotion of innovative technologies.54 The
specific uses proscribed by copyright law are understood within a particular
technological, social, and market context. Disruptive technologies alter this
landscape and raise such provocative questions as what should constitute
copying, how broad is the right to adapt, what constitutes a public
performance, and what is a distribution? There is no reason to think that
these questions should be answered in favor of the copyright owner. If the
goal of copyright is to promote progress in science and the useful arts in its
own way, then arguably these questions should be answered in favor of the
disruptive technologies. At the minimum, courts should engage in a more
agnostic examination of these questions, especially when the Copyright Act
is ambiguous on the issue. Instead, the Supreme Court has, through its Sony
and Grokster decisions, grafted a theory of secondary liability taken from
patent law and adapted it into the traditionally more flexible contours of
51

Id. at 977.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (extending copyright protection to original works in a tangible
medium of expression).
53
See id. § 106.
54
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
52
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copyright law.
What is missing in the Sony and Grokster cases is a systematic
understanding of the transactional relationship between copyright owners
and the creators of disruptive technologies. The two cases focus
respectively on the relationship between copyright owners and users and
between the creator of new technologies and users, but neglect the set of
transactions that might exist between copyright owners and creators of new
technologies. Of course, I am not naïve enough to think that a little theory is
what is needed to make these cases turn out the way I think they should. My
broader point is that while Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes the
transactional turn in Intellectual Property, in large part, it has not
appreciated the full set of consequences stemming from this turn. In part,
the movement I am describing is still a work in progress. The emerging
case law and its missteps provide scholars ample fodder for future scholarly
creativity. A deeper appreciation of the transactional edge of Intellectual
Property can lead to better Intellectual Property policy.
III. THE TRANSACTIONAL TURN IN PRACTICE
What bridges theory and practice is the teaching of law, at least
ideally. This section examines how the transactional turn in Intellectual
Property has affected the teaching of Intellectual Property. Specifically, the
focus is on the use of Intellectual Property to promote and motivate
transactional skills in the law school curriculum.
There are five areas where Intellectual Property and transactional
legal skills overlap: (1) formation of a business, (2) licensing, (3)
employment, (4) identifying sources of transactional value, and (5)
securities disclosure and due diligence. Transactional skills are most critical
at the formation stage of a business. The formation stage also raises
numerous Intellectual Property issues, such as trademark registration and
protection, patenting, and the identification and clearance of Intellectual
Property rights. Businesses at various stages have to decide between
making or buying, a decision which affects the negotiation and drafting of
licenses. The internal organization of a business also hinges on employment
decisions, the choices of whether to use independent contractors or
employees, and the terms on which these parties are hired. The choice of
the type of worker and the terms of employment may be shaped by the
Intellectual Property strategies of the firm. Finally, Intellectual Property is a
source of transactional value within a firm, and the identification of
Intellectual Property sources of value would affect disclosure requirements
and the due diligence of a seller and purchaser of a firm's securities and
other assets.
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These five practical areas of overlap translate into a distinct set of
transactional skills that can be effectively conveyed through the teaching of
Intellectual Property. The first transactional skill is identifying business
assets. Understanding Intellectual Property law and institutions is critical in
identifying the sources of value for a business and the types of business
assets which can be the basis for realizing value. Identifying what is a
patent, copyright, and trademark, as well as what is protectable by patent,
copyright, or trademark, is foundational for recognizing and valuing
business assets. The second skill is in understanding how background
common law and statutory law serve as defaults for contractual negotiation
in some instances and as immutable rules in others. In other words,
Intellectual Property law shapes the contours of a business asset and affects
its value. The final skill is in negotiating the rights over Intellectual
Property in order to realize and transfer these sources of value and to avoid
litigation over these assets. Intellectual Property provides a basis for
teaching business planning and organizational skills.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSACTIONAL TURN
In this Section, I will discuss how to integrate a transactionallyoriented Intellectual Property course into the law school curriculum. Some
of the ideas expressed here are based on my experiences writing and
teaching a co-authored casebook on this subject. For more reading and a
different perspective, I highly recommend Sean M. O' Connor’s work on the
subject.55 I know many schools have implemented a transactional
Intellectual Property course, and I apologize for not mentioning these efforts
in more detail.56
It is important to address the issue for the law school with a lean
curriculum, where faculty and administrators may view a transactionallyoriented Intellectual Property course as too exotic or impractical to offer.
There are ways to integrate a transactional Intellectual Property component
into lean curricula beyond hiring an upper level adjunct to teach a
specialized course to a handful of students. First, transactional concepts can
be introduced into a basic Intellectual Property course with some attention to
licensing and employment issues. Second, Intellectual Property issues can
be integrated into a business organizations course, especially one that
discusses start-up businesses. Intellectual Property issues may also be raised
in a discussion of securities and due diligence to the extent that these topics
are addressed in the business curriculum. Such inclusion can enrich the
55
Sean M. O’Connor, Teaching IP From An Entrepreneurial Counseling and Transactional
Perspective, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 877, 888-89 (2008).
56
See, e.g., Georgetown Law, Curriculum: Intellectual Property, Entertainment and Technology
Law, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_clusters.cfm?Status=Cluster&Detail=14 (last
visited May 8, 2010).
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discussion of these fields and introduce contemporary topics.
For a school with a slightly larger curriculum, there is of course
more room to integrate transactional Intellectual Property courses into the
set of electives available for students. A third-year capstone course on
transactional Intellectual Property would be a desirable way to introduce
business students to Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property students
to business. Ideally, a survey Intellectual Property course or a basic
business organizations course could be prerequisites for the Intellectual
Property course, or you could require one of these two courses as a
prerequisite for the Intellectual Property course. The course could be open
to business school students, permitting classroom assignments allowing
business schools and law schools to work together. As a third-year capstone
course, the focus would be on integrating skills learned during the previous
two years of law school and for laying a foundation for future practice.
Such a capstone course would complement courses on law and
entrepreneurship like the ones taught and developed by Gordon Smith,
Darian Ibrahim, and others.57 Furthermore, for law schools that are
associated with universities with technology transfer offices, such a course
might benefit students employed by these offices or might serve as a basis
for a clinical Intellectual Property component in the curriculum.
Thinking more globally, a transactional Intellectual Property course
might alter how Intellectual Property and business transactions are taught.
In most schools, Intellectual Property is introduced through a survey course.
There is some ongoing controversy over whether an Intellectual Property
course is necessary, but my sense is that the debate is over. Most serious
schools offer a survey Intellectual Property course that presents the four big
areas of Intellectual Property (trade secrets, copyright, patent, and
trademark) in an integrated and comprehensive way. The idea behind such a
course is to lay a foundation for more advanced courses. While this survey
course has traditionally been doctrinally focused with an eye towards
litigation practice as the norm, there is no reason why the basic survey
course could not be taught as a transactions-oriented course.
The three principle themes of the course would be identifying
Intellectual Property assets (that is, identify what can be the basis for trade
secret, copyright, patent, or trademark protection), learning how to secure
rights in these assets (use of non-disclosure agreements and non-competition
agreements, the basics of patent and trademark prosecution, an introduction
to work-for-hire, and other employment issues), and learning how to realize
value through licensing practice. Personally, I have not taught the survey
course primarily in this way when I have taught it. I do touch on some of
57

See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs On Horseback: Reflections On the
Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 71 (2008).
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the business issues raised by Intellectual Property, but my course has been
fairly traditional. There is no reason, however, why the survey course could
not be taught with a transactional slant as opposed to the traditional
litigation or constitutional policy slant. I should point out here that my coauthors, Richard Gruner and Jay Kesan, have an Intellectual Property survey
casebook with Thomson-West (on which Robert Reis is also a co-author),58
and we have tried to integrate transactional concepts into that book, partly to
lay a foundation for our Intellectual Property and business organizations
course and casebook (previously mentioned).
In addition, transactional Intellectual Property might alter how we
think of the traditional business organizations course. Intellectual Property
is an important tool for business organizations, a mechanism for codifying
knowledge within a firm and for defining its boundaries. Scholarship
developed by Paul Heald,59 Dan Burk and Brett McDonnell,60 and me61 has
explored this issue. In terms of teaching, the links between Intellectual
Property and the firm would shift the focus of the traditional business course
to start-ups, employment, and licensing issues. For those who cover
business taxation, the intersection of Intellectual Property and tax could also
be introduced. Some reading this may view my suggestion as just adding
more to an already bulging course. My suggestion, however, is not to add to
the set of materials out there but to propose an alternative way of teaching
transactional skills that recognizes how Intellectual Property issues inform
the current practice and shape the legal regulation of business activity.
V. A BEND IN THE RIVER?
Debates within Intellectual Property are often debates about the
identity of Intellectual Property. Similarly, debates within law schools are
often about the nature and direction of the legal profession. The
transactional turn in Intellectual Property suggests that the debates over
Intellectual Property and the role of law schools have converged. Both
debates now center on the need for a transactional focus in how Intellectual
Property law functions and on defining what goals the law schools should
serve. My narrow point in these pages is that Intellectual Property is
moving in a transactional direction. Law schools, in turn, should see that
the role of the Intellectual Property curriculum is to reinforce transactional
skills and strengthen the role of attorneys in adding value to transactions. It
is my hope that recognizing the transactional turn in Intellectual Property
58
SHUBHA GHOSH, RICHARD GRUNER, JAY KESAN & ROBERT REIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY (2007).
59
Paul J. Heald, A Transactional Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 476-77 (2005).
60
Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property
Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 575 (2007).
61
Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual
Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1183 (2008).
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will be an important first step towards a broader debate about the role of
economic rights and the function of legal skills, shaping and serving them
for the broader social good.
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